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There has been a spirited debate about the merits of mark-to-market accounting for ﬁ  nancial institutions 
for some time now. Many argue that market prices provide the best estimate of value available and should 
always be used. However, others suggest that in times of crisis market prices are not a good reﬂ  ection
of value and their use can lead to serious distortions. This article explains the circumstances where
market prices do reﬂ  ect future earning power and those where market imperfections imply that they do not.
We suggest that in ﬁ  nancial crisis situations where liquidity is scarce and prices are low as a result, 
market prices should be supplemented with both model-based and historic cost valuations. The rest of the 
time and in particular when asset prices are low because expectations of future cash ﬂ  ows have fallen,
mark-to-market accounting should instead be used.ARTICLES
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T
here has been an extensive debate in recent 
years on the advantages and disadvantages 
of moving towards a full mark-to-market 
accounting system for ﬁ  nancial institutions such 
as banks and insurance companies. This debate 
was initiated with the move of the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and the
US Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) 
to make changes in this direction as part of an 
attempt to standardise accounting standards across 
countries. The debate has two opposing views.
On the one hand, mark-to-market accounting has 
the advantage of reﬂ  ecting the true (and relevant) 
value of the balance sheets of ﬁ  nancial institutions 
and therefore of allowing regulators, investors and 
other users of accounting information to better 
assess the risk proﬁ   le of ﬁ  nancial  institutions. 
On the other hand, mark-to-market accounting is 
thought to lead to excessive and artiﬁ  cial volatility.
As a consequence, under this accounting system the 
value of the balance sheets of ﬁ  nancial institutions 
may be driven by short-term ﬂ  uctuations in the market 
that do not reﬂ  ect the value of the fundamentals and 
the long-term values of assets and liabilities.
If ﬁ   nancial markets operated perfectly in 
the way that the models used by ﬁ  nancial 
institutions usually assume, then mark-to-market
accounting would indeed be best. In this situation, 
market prices accurately reﬂ   ect the future 
earning power of assets. If the market value
of an institution’s assets falls below the market 
value of its liabilities then it will not be able to meet 
all of its obligations. Mark-to-market accounting 
will indicate this shortfall to regulators, investors, 
depositors and other interested parties and they can 
take action accordingly.
Many people have argued that ﬁ  nancial markets are 
effectively perfect and complete. However, in times 
of crisis it appears that they do not work in the way 
that they would if this was the case. This notion is a 
very old one. Bagehot (1873), for example, suggested 
that in response to crises central banks should value 
bank collateral weighting panic and pre-panic prices 
as market prices are not accurate measure of values 
in those circumstances. A more recent illustration
of the malfunctioning of market prices was provided 
a decade ago by the demise of Long-Term Capital 
Management (LTCM). This was a hedge fund that 
made convergence trades. These involved ﬁ  nding 
securities whose returns were highly correlated 
but whose prices were slightly different. The fund 
would then short (i.e. borrow) the one with the high 
price and use the proceeds to go long in the one with 
the low price. The convergence trades that LTCM 
took included the sovereign bonds of European 
countries that were moving towards European 
Monetary Union, and on-the-run and off-the-run 
US government bonds. Since the price differences 
were small the strategy involved a large amount
of borrowing. For example, at the beginning of 1998,
the ﬁ   rm had equity of about USD  5 billion
and had borrowed over USD 125 billion. In the 
ﬁ  rst two years of the fund’s existence it was extremely 
successful and earned returns for its investors 
of around 40 percent. However, 1997 was not as 
successful with a return of 27 percent which was 
about the same as the return on equities that year.
On August 17, 1998 Russia devalued the rouble and 
declared a moratorium on about 281 billion roubles 
(USD 13.5 billion) of government debt. Despite the 
small scale of the default, this triggered a global crisis 
with extreme volatility in many ﬁ  nancial markets. 
Many of the convergence trades that LTCM had 
made started to lose money as the ﬂ  ight to quality 
caused prices to move in unexpected directions and
to diverge from discounted expected future cash 
ﬂ  ows. By September 22, 1998 the value of LTCM’s 
capital had fallen to USD 600 million. The Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York coordinated a rescue 
whereby the banks that had lent signiﬁ  cant amounts 
to LTCM would put USD 3.5 million for 90 percent of 
the equity of the fund and take over the management 
of the portfolio. The Federal Reserve Bank
of New York justiﬁ  ed its action of facilitating a private 
sector bailout of LTCM by arguing that if the fund 
had been liquidated many prices in illiquid markets 
would have fallen and this would have caused further 
liquidations and so on in a downward spiral.
The current crisis that started at the end of July 2007 
provides yet another illustration of the fact that 
markets are imperfect and prices do not reﬂ  ect 
fundamentals. Some banks have had to write down 
the AAA-rated super senior tranches of collateralised 
debt obligations (CDOs) by as much as 30 percent1 
due to a fall in their market prices. If this change in 
price was due to deterioration in fundamentals then
1  See Tett (2008).ARTICLES
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it would be necessary to believe that the ultimate 
percentage loss would be 38 percent. This would be 
justiﬁ  ed, if, for example, three quarters of households
with subprime securitised mortgages would default 
and price falls would continue. This seems, however, 
implausible given that none of the AAA-rated tranches 
have yet defaulted and, as the Bank of England also 
estimated, there should not be any future default in
AAA-rated subprime mortgage-backed securities (MBS),
even with a continued decline in US house prices.2 
This suggests that factors other than future discounted 
cash ﬂ  ows are driving prices. Still, because of the use
of fair value accounting, ﬁ  nancial companies around 
the world have been hit by more than USD 300 billion 
in writedowns and been forced to raise more than 
USD 260 billion from outside investors since last year,
according to analysts at the Bank of America.3
What are the market imperfections that led to 
such large ﬂ   uctuations in prices in situations 
such as the Russian Crisis of 1998 and the current 
crisis? In our paper entitled “Mark-to-market 
accounting and liquidity pricing”,4 we analyse 
the effects of using mark-to-market accounting 
when ﬁ  nancial markets are imperfect. The main 
insight is that in times of ﬁ   nancial crisis the 
interaction of institutions and markets can lead to 
situations where prices in markets do not reﬂ  ect
future payoffs but rather reﬂ   ect the amount
of cash or liquidity available to buyers in the market. 
If mark-to-market accounting is used, then the 
volatility of asset prices directly affects the value
of banks’ assets. This can lead to contagion and force 
banks into insolvency even though they would be 
fully able to cover their commitments if they were 
allowed to continue to operate until the assets 
mature. In contrast, if historic cost accounting is
in use, this problem does not compromise the 
solvency of banks as it does not affect the accounting 
value of their assets. Thus, historical cost accounting 
may prevent crises which would occur under
mark-to-market accounting.
The result that mark-to-market accounting can be 
distortionary and generate “artiﬁ  cial” contagion is due 
to imperfections in the supply of liquidity. In a world 
of perfect and complete markets risk management 
can easily ensure that the bank or intermediary
has the correct amount of liquidity in every situation. 
With perfect and complete markets it is possible 
to use a full set of derivatives and other securities
(or equivalently dynamic trading strategies) to 
ensure liquidity is received from counterparties in 
every situation when it is needed; or in technical 
terms, in every state of the world.
In contrast when markets are imperfect because 
they are incomplete, liquidity provision is achieved 
by selling assets in the market when the liquidity 
is required. Asset prices are determined by the 
total available liquidity or in other words by the
“cash in the market”. It is necessary that some 
ﬁ  nancial institutions hold liquidity and stand ready 
to buy assets when they are sold. They are no longer 
compensated for the cost of providing liquidity in 
each and every state as with complete markets. 
Instead the cost must be made up on average across 
all states and this is where the problem lies.
The providers of liquidity have the alternative 
of investing in high return, but less liquid,
long assets. There is an opportunity cost to holding 
liquidity since this has a lower return than the 
long assets. In order for ﬁ  nancial institutions to 
be willing to supply liquidity they must be able to 
make a proﬁ  t in some situations. If nobody held 
liquidity then when banks and intermediaries 
sold assets to acquire liquidity their price would 
collapse to zero. This would provide an incentive 
for some institutions to hold liquidity since they 
can acquire assets very cheaply in these situations. 
In equilibrium prices will be bid up to the level 
where the proﬁ  t in these situations where banks 
and intermediaries sell is sufﬁ  cient to compensate 
the providers of liquidity for all the other situations 
where they do not use the liquidity and simply bear 
the opportunity cost of holding it. In other words 
asset prices are low in the situations where there is 
an aggregate shortage of liquidity and some banks 
and intermediaries need liquidity.5
An important aspect of this analysis is that the low 
asset prices that occur in situations where there is 
a shortage of liquidity do not require there to be 
informational problems. However, it is certainly the 
case that informational problems exacerbate the falls 
2  See Giles and Tett (2008).
3  See Guerrera and Hughes (2008).
4  See Allen and Carletti (2008).
5  See Allen and Gale (2007) for a full account of this.ARTICLES
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in price. If buying institutions, in addition to bearing 
the opportunity cost of holding liquidity, need to 
expend signiﬁ  cant resources to evaluate the assets 
they are purchasing, equilibrium prices will be even 
lower. Now prices must be low enough to cover in 
addition the cost of due diligence. This is particularly 
important for securitisations of subprime mortgages 
and is consistent with the large fall in their prices 
in the current crisis. Finally, if there are problems 
of adverse selection, this will further exacerbate the 
necessary discount the assets trade at.
Based on these arguments mark-to-market 
accounting has signiﬁ  cant drawbacks. As many 
have argued it leads to large changes in ﬁ  nancial 
institutions’ balance sheets that are not justiﬁ  ed by 
the fundamentals. These changes do not reﬂ  ect an 
inability to meet future commitments and so do not 
reﬂ  ect insolvency. When historic cost accounting 
is used these problems are avoided to a large 
extent. However, historic cost accounting also has 
drawbacks. In particular, if price changes do reﬂ  ect 
fundamentals then historic cost accounting is not 
desirable and mark-to-market is superior.
A good example where historic cost accounting failed 
where mark-to-market would probably not have done 
is the Savings and Loan Crisis in the United States 
in the 1980’s. Here the fall in the prices of the assets 
was due to a collapse in the fundamentals. The fall in 
oil prices meant that the expected future cash ﬂ  ows
from many properties in Texas and other
oil-producing states fell drastically. These price falls 
were not due to temporary liquidity factors of the 
type discussed above but instead were permanent.
In this case historic cost accounting allowed banks 
to hide the extent of their problems for a signiﬁ  cant 
period of time. Mark-to-market accounting would 
have led to a much quicker recognition and resolution 
of the problem.
This contrast between situations where asset prices 
are low because of liquidity factors and where they 
are low because of lower expected cash ﬂ  ows is at 
the center of the debate over the advantages and 
disadvantages of mark-to-market accounting versus 
historic cost accounting. The problem is that neither 
system is perfect. Each works in some circumstances 
but not in others. Both sides have validity in the 
arguments that they make.
How can the problem be solved? A recent report
of the Institute of International Finance also argues 
that marking-to-market can create a downward 
spiral in asset prices and artiﬁ  cially transform a 
liquidity problem into a solvency one. According 
to the report, one way to solve the problem is to 
allow banks to value instruments using their own 
models or book value when markets are disrupted; 
and to give banks the possibility to move assets from 
trading books onto banking books, where assets 
are “held to maturity” and mark-to-market rarely 
applies.6 The report has the merit that it stresses 
once again the difﬁ  culty and the problems linked 
to the use of mark-to-market in disrupted markets. 
The problem with this suggestion, however, is 
that it leads to a potential moral hazard problem
if banks are allowed to “park” volatile risky assets 
from the trading books in the banking books till 
market conditions are restored to normal.
What in our view is of crucial importance is to 
provide the users of accounting information such 
as regulators and investors with the information 
that allows them to understand at a deeper level 
what is happening and how this should affect 
their actions. Mark-to-market values are useful 
and should certainly be disclosed. However, there 
needs to be additional information to allow users to 
identify the extent to which falls in asset prices are 
due to market conditions such as liquidity factors 
and the extent to which they are due to changes in 
discounted expected future cash ﬂ  ows. If the users 
of accounting information can distinguish between 
these factors they will be in a much better position 
to decide how to proceed. This is also in line with 
the suggestion of the Bank of England that auditors 
need “authoritative guidance” on the application of 
fair-value accounting rules when market prices are 
dislocated from fundamentals values.7
What information that is easily available can be 
used for this purpose? The IASB promulgates the 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs) 
that apply to all listed European Union/European
Economic Area companies. The FASB determines 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) 
and these together with Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) regulations determine the way 
that companies in the United States report their 
results. The approach of both for determining the 
6  See Mackintosh (2008).
7  See Giles and Tett (2008).ARTICLES
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fair values of ﬁ  nancial instruments as outlined
in IFRS 7 and FAS 7 are similar. However, the 
latter is more speciﬁ  c.8 It speciﬁ  es three levels.
Level-one valuations, which are to be used if 
available, are based on observable prices in liquid 
markets. Level-two valuations are based on prices on 
nearby dates or prices of very similar instruments. 
These are to be used if level-one valuations are not 
available. Finally, level-three valuations allow the use
of theoretical valuation models. For example, for MBS, 
these might involve assumptions concerning default 
rates and loss ratios. These model-based valuations 
require disclosure of the model assumptions. They 
are used when level-one and level-two valuations 
are not available.
These three valuation methods should give very 
similar results most of the time. In such cases there is 
no point in disclosing anything other than level-one
valuations based on observable prices in liquid 
markets as is currently done. In times of crisis, 
though, the different methods can give very different 
values. The example above during the current 
crisis of the 30 percent fall in the market prices
of AAA-rated super senior tranches of CDOs is 
one where model-based valuations using plausible 
assumptions would give signiﬁ  cantly higher values. 
Rather than the current approach of only using 
level-three valuations when level-one and -two 
valuations are unavailable, an alternative would be 
to also report level-three valuations if they differ 
signiﬁ  cantly from level-one (or level-two) valuations. 
One possible threshold for triggering the reporting of 
both valuations would be a difference of 5 percent, 
for example. In such circumstances, it may also be 
helpful to report historic cost values, since these are 
more objective than level-three valuations given they 
do not require extensive assumptions. The reporting 
of multiple values would alert regulators, investors 
and other users to the fact that they need to investigate 
more carefully what is happening in the markets 
where prices are determined. This will allow them 
to use better judgment as to whether the banks and 
other ﬁ  nancial institutions are insolvent or not and to 
investigate more thoroughly whether the institutions 
are able to meet their future obligations. In case they 
are, regulators should probably practice a form of 
“forbearance” in that they should allow banks not to 
fully write down the value of their assets according to 
market conditions, in order to avoid artiﬁ  cial volatility 
and its consequent solvency impairment. This would 
help to eliminate the procyclicality problem implied 
by fair value accounting as there would be no need 
for banks to raise further capital.
In conclusion, we have argued that both sides in the debate of mark-to-market versus historic cost accounting 
have merit. Mark-to-market works well and reﬂ  ects the true underlying situation most of the time.
However, in crisis times when there is a shortage of liquidity, mark-to-market values do not reﬂ  ect future 
earning power and cannot be used to assess the solvency of ﬁ  nancial institutions. The crisis starting
in late July of 2007 has provided some examples of this. In these circumstances market prices are driven 
by liquidity provision incentives and not fundamental values. In such cases historic cost accounting
can provide a better indication of true value. However, historic cost accounting has the drawback that 
it misses drops in value that are caused by deterioration in the discounted expected cash ﬂ  ows as the 
proponents of mark-to-market accounting suggest.
Our solution to this problem is to adapt mark-to-market accounting using easily available information. 
When model-based valuations based on plausible assumptions differ by more than (say) 5 percent
from market based valuations, both types of valuation together with traditional historic cost valuations 
should be provided. This will signal to the users of information that they need to be careful to identify what 
is going on in the markets. This is not a perfect system but it is practical and it will be an improvement
over the current one.
8  See International Monetary Fund (2008), chapter 2, annex 2.1.ARTICLES
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